Kenneth Anderson Doesn’t Get It, But Does
Michael Cecire • August 25, 2008 • Uncategorized
A serious discussion of any conflict, especially one with as much baggage as what sparked the rapid escalation of the recent Russo-Georgian war, is bound to be accompanied by shills for each side, shills for hardline equivalence, and the occasional nugget of wisdom – usually from more thoughtful, sober minds that try to examine the situation with some degree of context. Professor Kenneth Anderson, on a lengthy and thoughtful post on Opinio Juris, does just this when he writes about the fallout from the War. However, while I find his analysis cogent and generally correct, I take serious issue with the way he characterizes Georgian democracy and the glaring omission of certain details of the socio-ethnic landscape of the region.
Anderson lists four main points: (1) Russia is engaging in revanchist imperialism in its near abroad; (2) The role of NATO is changing, and will likely be put to test against ‘free riding’ nations in Western Europe; (3) “It is a grave error to conflate rolling back Russian expansionism with the idea that Georgia should have actual political, security, and military control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia”; and (4) The US must discern between Georgian ‘participatory ethnic nationalism’ and real democracy.
Allow me to first concede that on his third point, although I am unashamedly pro-Georgia in this respect, I cannot ignore the political and strategic realities that offer but one path: Georgia cannot – and will not – command sovereignty over either South Ossetia or Abkhazia in any near or conceivable future. In this, I must agree with Professor Anderson’s well-built argument that to pretend otherwise is deleterious to US interests, Georgia’s own progress, and regional security.
My view, based on what I saw in the brutal, unforgiving, as-bad-as-Yugoslavia ethnic cleansing wars of fifteen years ago, is that it is simply impossible for Georgia to govern those territories. I don’t think it was possible from the moment that Georgia declared independence; after all, secession happened practically moments later. And I emphatically believe that the level of brutal violence on each side sealed it.
There’s no doubting that the original conflicts from the 1990s surely did not have any one ‘good’ side as both Georgians and rebel militias engaged in well-documented campaigns of ethnic cleansing. To pretend otherwise, despite Georgia’s progress, is disingenuous and frankly, disgusting.
That said, Professor Anderson should also be aware of the fact that during the Georgian Civil War, residual Russian power was very much engaged in supporting separatist movements not only within Georgia, but throughout its near abroad. Though but a shadow of its former self, Russian support – often orchestrated through propaganda campaigns to undermine Georgian self-determination – was very clearly meant to destabilize an already weak Georgian state that is an inherently multi-ethnic project (more on that in a second). The Georgians, on the other hand, had no such patronage and were beset by economic difficulty, a severe leadership vacuum, and warlordism throughout the country (a problem that didn’t really come to any kind of resolution until 2003-2004).
Which brings me to my next point: Professor Anderson envelopes the Georgian issue squarely within the events that occurred and occur in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and somehow fails to mention other notable variables. Of particular note is the other previously Moscow-backed separatist enclave of Adjara. Once within the grip of autocratic strongman Aslan Abashidze, Adjara was soon ‘retaken’ by Tbilisi soon after Mikhail Saakashvili’s accession to the Georgian Presidency without a shot being fired. Although the Tbilisi government and the Batumi regime came startlingly close to open conflict, a people-power mini revolution swept through Adjara, forcing Abashidze to abdicate and flee to Moscow, where he now lives comfortably.
The Adjara incident is particularly critical in assessing the Georgian view that Georgia should and can be made whole once more. Despite the fact that Adjara came close to war with the Tbilisi government, widespread demonstrations against Abashidze’s autocracy – despite a Russian-certified ‘free and fair’ election where Abashidze garnered a vote in the ninety-something percentage area – returned Adjara to Tbilisi’s oversight. While many, including Professor Anderson, might counter that reunification was only possible because Adjara and Georgia never actually came to blows (so no ethnic cleansing), the tale seemed to illustrate two things: (1) Georgia appeared to demonstrate capability in regaining ‘lost’ lands, and even doing so with a minimal loss of life; and (2) The Tbilisi Government had the foresight to preserve Adjaran semi-autonomy – Adjara is considered an ‘Autonomous Republic,’ as is Abkhazia but not South Ossetia – and show an ability to respect the distinctiveness of ethnic sub-populations.
Furthermore, the Adjara question also lends some some extra context to the contention by Professor Anderson that Georgia is monoethnic. Adjarans are as easily distinguishable from ‘mainstream’ Georgians as the Abkhaz and certainly South Ossetians (who are much closer in many ways to Georgians than their Muslim cousins in Russia). While this doesn’t exactly ‘prove’ that the Georgia is a model multi-ethnic society, it does lend credence to the argument that a civic nationalism in Georgia is not only possible, but flourishing. Other very compelling examples of the same phenomenon can be seen with the Mingrelians of Samegrelo (with a language virtually indistinguishable from Georgian), the Svan, the Laz, and the heavy populations of Turkic and Armenian-Georgians in South and Eastern Georgia. While inter-ethnic relations aren’t exactly perfect – and I can attest to this having lived in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which has considerable populations of Armenians – relations are improving and people do live and work side by side. This is far, far more than can be said for the ethnically cleansed Abkhazia or South Ossetia.
This reality also conflicts directly with Professor Anderson’s assertion that Georgian democracy is “participatory ethnic nationalism.” While ethnic nationalism most certainly creeps into Georgian political discourse, its effects have hardly been catastrophic; in fact, one could certainly contend that Russian antagonism has only assisted in forging a common civic Georgian identity between historically competing groups within the South Caucasus cultural sphere. Georgians – of a variety of nationalities – have lent their vote to both Saakashvili’s ruling party and the loyal opposition in no correlative manner, further suggesting that ethnic nationalism is not the primary consideration. While Georgians surely wish to be strong and are probably powerfully guided by such inclinations, it should not be forgotten that the ongoing narrative of Russian intervention – both overt and subversive – is, in many ways, the genesis of the current crisis. How the Georgians responded to it in the past should not be ignored, but that in no way bestows equivalence between Georgia and the unfree, gangster regimes of the separatist regions or autocratic Moscow. For all Georgia’s problems, its relative transparency, openness, and liberalizing trajectory is far superior compared to that of Russia and its rebel client statelets.
Moreover, I should further like to note that Professor Anderson’s thoughts on the Rebel militias – that Georgians would/could have done the same – is problematic for one major reason: Russia had the full and complete capacity to prevent their wanton pillaging; on the other hand, Georgian troops while in South Ossetia and Tsinkhvali showed few signs of comparable lack of restraint. Admittedly, Georgian forces did not stay for long, but the idea that ethnic cleansing is somehow an immutable feature of the Georgian character is a pretty alarming charge, especially when placed against the backdrop of the facts available to us (Russian, separatist, and ‘volunteer’ units engaged in unimpeded destruction and shades of ethnic cleansing; Georgians did not) and the unmistakable political and social progress of Georgia since the Civil War and especially since 2003.
This brings me to my final point. Georgia’s trajectory, although bumpy and not without its setbacks (as occurred late last year), has been of steady progress despite Russian provocation and its continuing campaign of geopolitical sabotage. Professor Anderson’s discussion on the matter, though usefully informed by his experience as an observer in the region during the country’s civil war, regretfully leaves out a great deal of invaluable context. While it is naturally obtuse to assume that the Georgians are inherently ‘right’ because the Russians are so clearly wrong, the evidence does seem to indicate that Georgia has been struggling to make itself right – and not merely the Saakashvili administration, but the millions of Georgians on the ground who have labored endlessly to produce Georgia’s rather stunning turnaround despite regional instability and an antagonistic power to their north obviously interested in Georgia’s failure.
So I’m going to do the intellectually obscene thing and make it very clear that in this regard there is very little other alternative than to stand with Georgia. Whether Saakashvili is a lumbering blowhard or a Caucasian Reagan isn’t the point – the Georgia situation is a very clear example of Russia’s return to the policies of violent coercion, assumed after its repeated attempts to diplomatically and economically isolate Georgia magnificently failed. And although Georgia is the latest and most high profile, similar policies have been pursued at length by Moscow against other ‘hostile’ former dominions in its near abroad like Ukraine (the Crimea) and Moldova (Transdniester), for a couple of examples.
No one wants a fight on their hands, but it seems that we’re only deferring to a worse conflict down the road lest we make it clear – in actions, not merely hollow, useless words – that Russia’s aggression is unacceptable and will be regarded as such. But let me reiterate: I think Professor Anderson’s essential point – that Abkhazia and South Ossetia will never rejoin Georgia – is essentially correct. Even if I assume that the Georgians would extend themselves to their erstwhile kin as amicably as was demonstrated with the Adjarans, I do not think that it is politically viable nor realistic to believe that the Abkhaz or South Ossetians – however skewed their outlook by Russian propaganda, pensions, and passports – would suffer to live under Tbilisi’s administration. It just won’t work.
No, it’s time for Georgia to learn this lesson and accept the disunion as a permanent fixture. People will be angry – no less the thousands of resettled Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia and South Ossetia – but Georgian politics is ultimately guided by economic prosperity and military security, which has been an issue considered inseparable from territorial sovereignty (and apparently for good reason). NATO’s best role, in this case, is to offer Georgia a way to separate the situation with the conflict zones from the survival of the Georgian state; in such a framework, Georgian borders, for NATO’s purposes, would be drawn around those areas controlled by Tbilisi, and it would be that Georgia that is given a Membership Action Plan for NATO membership. It would guarantee Georgia’s security indefinitely for but the price of rebel-held, criminal regions that – for the most part – had been lost long ago.
Hat tip: Instapundit
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10 Responses to “Kenneth Anderson Doesn’t Get It, But Does”
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August 25th, 2008 1605 GMT
I know two things:
1) Georgians troops killed about 1600 citizens in South Osetia
2) After Russian troops came in South Osetia, killing of citizens was stopped.
So, who is right?
And I know another thing: Georgian “democratic” government blocked Russian Internet sites in Georgia… Because Georgian government don’t want its citizens know the truth. The truth about Georgians troops killed childes and destroying hospitals.
How many georgians was killed by russian troops? But Georgians troops killed about 1600 citizens in South Osetia.
It is a fact.
If you believe mass media, that tell you about peace Georgians – go in South Ossetia. I have friends there. Some of them was killed by Georgians aviation and tanks. They was just a civilians. One of them was found without his head, because it was cutten by Georgias troops
Hi Yuriy, and thank you for your comments.
Unfortunately, facts happen to be the first casualties of war, and especially so when Russia is involved. With regards to the figures you cite, which were recently revised downward by Russia, it has been far from verified as to the veracity of their claims. On the contrary, reports indicate that the toll is in fact dramatically lower. Of course, this wouldn’t be the first instance of false Russian propaganda. Suffice to say that the entirety of the Russian media is controlled by the Kremlin.
I can’t speak specifically to Russian websites being shut down, but it’s understandable given Georgia’s situation. Interesting that you mention that and fail to note the Georgian media and government websites that were (and continue to be) cyber-attacked by Russian hackers in a manner similar to what happened in Estonia recently.
I haven’t been to South Ossetia, but I did live in Georgia. What I did see was a flourishing democratic, multiethnic society. No one can say the same for South Ossetia.
Thanks again.
>Suffice to say that the entirety of the Russian media is controlled by the Kremlin.
Hmm… West and American media also controlled by European and American government. Don’t remember the fact, when American media stopped translate information about war in Iraq because of “patriotic fillings”?
I can read CNN and BBC propaganda… I also read Kremlin propaganda. I can see the both sides.
>Interesting that you mention that and fail to note the
>Georgian media and government websites that were (and
>continue to be) cyber-attacked by Russian hackers in a
>manner similar to what happened in Estonia recently.
You see… nowadays it is so simple to protect site from cyber-attack… So I think about two alternatives: 1) Georgian site-makers are very-very silly or it is a provocation from Georgia.
Now some questions, that force me think, that “Kremlin propaganda” close to the truth, that “American-European propaganda”
1) Georgia attaked fist. Georgia attacked Russian peacekeepes. It is the truth because we all see the map of Georgian Invasion sing by Georgian Generals.
2) Georgia don’t tell the world how many people was killed in the war. Russia and South Ossetia don’t hide this information. Georgia hides. Why?
3) Georgia blocked Russian sites. Why? Russia don’t block any information site from our citizens.
4) European journalist was not in Tshinval, where Georgian troops killed about 1600 citizens. Why?
5) Georgian tanks bombed hospital in South Ossetia in the first night of Georgian invasion. Why?
Now, can you answer to these questions?
You also can answer some questions to me. May be I’ll change my opinion
@Yuriy:
1. Ha, Western media – for the most part – is independent. While the degree to which they support their respective countries’ policies vary, none can be compared to the total parroting of Russian media to Kremlin policy. I don’t think I need to elaborate any further.
2. -Georgia did NOT attack first. South Ossetian militias began shelling Georgian villages well before the Georgian response, and that was after a cease-fire was not respected by Russian proxies.
- No one knows for sure the total casualties from the war, however, we do know that Russian claims are well exaggerated; the South Ossetian figure may well be in the dozens, not the hundreds or thousands.
- Considering massive Russian cyberwar activities, the relatively minor response by the Georgian government to block access to Russian sites is both understandable and mostly irrelevant.
- Of course foreign journalists weren’t in Tskhinvali; Russians were pre-placed as their entire operation was premeditated. Foreign journalists did not have time to arrive to report.
- Georgian tanks bombed a South Ossetian hospital? Really? I think I need to ask you to back that up with evidence, although it might be too much to ask why Russia used Tupolev strategic bombers, cluster bombs, paratroopers, the Black Sea fleet, and cruise missiles to destroy hundreds of civilian and economic targets in an already weakened, helpless Georgia.
Thank you again for your comments, but I’m afraid they are badly misinformed and merely puppet the kind of useless garbage peddled by the Russian leadership, which is inexcusable.
>Ha, Western media – for the most part – is independent.
I can see the Western media and Russian media… all of them are not independent. They are the same. But told us about fact from the different position.
Just a little example:
http://www.theage.com.au/world/1600-dead-in-georgia-fighting-20080809-3sqi.html
“As the conflict, which has left at least 1600 dead,
escalated, Russian warplanes bombed and nearly destroyed a key Georgian port and hit another city.”
Why this “independent” media hide, that all of this 1600 dead was civilians of South Ossetia killed by Georgian troops? This “independent” media hide this information.
And another little example. Do you know about plan of Medvedev-Sarkozi? Western media tell you that Russia don’t perform this plan and hide, that Georgia don’t perform this plan too.
>Georgia did NOT attack first.
Read official Georgian media: http://www.newsgeorgia.ru/geo1/20080809/42300968.html
Google can help you trasnlate it all and I’ll translate two messages:
02:45, 8 august Georgian troops entered Dimuha, Muguti and Dmenisi villages.
05:30, 8 august First Russian troops entered in South Ossetia through Rock Tunnel
So offical site of Georgia write, that Georgian troops attacked fist. And they knew that South Ossetia is protected by Russian peacekeepers by mandate UN.
>Considering massive Russian cyberwar activities, the
>relatively minor response by the Georgian government to
>block access to Russian sites is both understandable and
>mostly irrelevant.
So Georgian government raped information freedom?
>Of course foreign journalists weren’t in Tskhinvali
But many of them was in Tbilisi. Why? I think that they know that Tskhinvali will be bombed (so they must survive) and in Tbilisi will be peace. And foreign journalists didn’t want to comment the Georgian invasion in South Ossetia.
>Georgian tanks bombed a South Ossetian hospital? Really?
Photo of Tskhinvali hospital http://www.vesti.ru/photo.html?num=9&id=199907
http://www.vesti.ru/photo.html?num=12&id=200102
If you want, I can give you more photos
>I think I need to ask you to back that up with evidence,
>although it might be too much to ask why Russia used
>Tupolev strategic bombers, cluster bombs, paratroopers,
>the Black Sea fleet, and cruise missiles to destroy
>hundreds of civilian and economic targets in an already
>weakened, helpless Georgia.
Hundreds of civilian?? Georgia don’t tell us officially how many civilian was killed. Russian troops attacked only Georgian troops. If they wanted to attack civilian, they will bomb Tbilisi like USA bombed Bagdad.
What about “cluster bombs”, I hear many stories and see photos how NATO bombs Yugoslaviya by “cluster bombs”. But I don’ believe in “cluster bombs” in Yugoslaviya and in Georgia. If there were “cluster bombs”, Georgia tells us officially how may (in accurate figures) civilians was killed. But Georgia hide it. Why?
>but I’m afraid they are badly misinformed and merely
>puppet the kind of useless garbage peddled by the Russian
> leadership, which is inexcusable.
I can read Russian media and West media. You and Georgians can read only West media.
You can read http://www.russiatoday.com/en and compare what information West media don’t tell you.
Michael Cecire, thank you, giving me ability to tell some facts, that doesn’t published in west media.
May be me English is rather bad, but I think, you understand me.
I have found some information:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1043236/Georgia-overrun-Russian-troops-scale-ground-invasion-begins.html
Georgian troops killed at least 2000 civilians and Russian troops killed 129 civilians …. Who is aggressor?
I haven’t been to South Ossetia, but I did live in Georgia. What I did see was a flourishing democratic, multiethnic society. No one can say the same for South Ossetia.
i agree on it 101%.
i’m also refugee from abkhazia i was going to school in sukhumi, but in summer 92 i never went to my school. because in 14 august by the way KGBs fave time to start dirty operations of exterminating entire populations.So any way we as a children knew what was going on and russian dirty goals older people would discus in neighborhood and russians also supported georgian criminals i agree on that they were criminals they began looting in tbilisi moved down to mingrelia where they have killed raped lots of mengreelians(but mengrelians never took it as fault of entire geo nation as did abkhazians)and so they entered into abkhazia of course they were driven by KGB every their move maybe that’s why up to today geo defence minister who invaded abkhazia today enjoys dacha of russian general as present for good work(.anyways to make it short and give an example that abkhazian and georgians are not enemy but part of one society part of one culture.
my good friend from school in sukhumi just got married with abkhazian girl she moved with him to tbilisi and today they have a son who’s half georgian half abkhazian. and so it will be one day abkhazians themselves will join democratic georgia with free society and rights and freedoms will be protected of every citizen no matter to which monority he belongs.